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Abstract
In order to understand the development of common orientation of opinions in the
modern world we propose a model of a society described as a large collection of
agents that exchange their expressed opinions under the influence of their mutual
interactions and external events. In particular we introduce an interaction bias
which results in the emergence of a collective memory such that the society is
able to store and recall information coming from several external signals. Our
model shows how the inner structure of the society and its future reactions
are shaped by its own history. We provide an analytical explanation of such
mechanism and we study the features of external influences with higher impact
on the society. We show the emergent similarity between the reaction of a
society modelled in this way and the Hopfield-like mechanism of information
retrieval in Neural Networks.
Keywords: Opinion dynamics, History of Agreement and Disagreement,
External Information, Collective memory
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1. Introduction
Contemporary human society lies under the effect of an almost fully ac-
complished globalisation. International barriers have become more permeable
thanks to the spread of English as universal language. Connections of individu-
als develop across huge distances throughout the world thanks to the daily use
of social media and the immediate coverage nowadays attained by information
media. These observations naturally support the picture of a global society
described as a large collective system involving strongly interacting degrees of
freedom, represented by the individuals’ actions or opinions. With this picture
in mind, scientists started to study the human society by means of a statistical
mechanics approach. Early results of this effort resulted in the first opinion
Email addresses: gioia.boschi@kcl.ac.uk (Gioia Boschi),
chiara.cammarota@kcl.ac.uk (Chiara Cammarota), reimer.kuehn@kcl.ac.uk (Reimer
Kühn)
Preprint submitted to Physica A July 16, 2020
dynamics model proposed by a physicist [1] and the introduction of the Ising
model to study consensus in societies [2, 3] . An important amount of work
followed these first seminal articles, building a literature in which the pressure
of the society is modelled by assimilative interactions that mimic the tendency
of people to imitation. The most widely studied models of a society of this kind
come from physics, i.e. the Voter model [4] the Ising model with its variants
[5] already mentioned and the Majority rule model [6, 7]. Yet, despite many
other interesting features, it soon appeared evident that models only based on
assimilative interactions describe a society in which full consensus is typically
inevitable. To overcome this problem the concept of homophily [8, 9], that is
the tendency of people to interact more often or with grater intensity with sim-
ilar others, has been introduced [10, 11, 12]. However, the fragmentation of
the society into groups with different opinions obtained in models that include
both assimilation and homophily was found to be unstable under the introduc-
tion of noise [13, 14]. In fact an infinitesimal amount of noise it is seen to
irremediably redirect the society to a state of full agreement. The idea that
antagonistic interactions [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23] and xenophobia
(the phenomenon for which the larger the dissimilarity between two interact-
ing individuals, the more they evaluate each other negatively) [16, 17, 23, 24]
should be taken into account to resolve this issue has been developed only fairly
recently. In the present work we build up on these observations and put them
in conjunction with the traditional approach that assumes imitation tendencies
between individuals. We propose a model for opinion formation based on the
rule that individuals in agreement with each other tend to reinforce their mutual
positive influence, while individuals in disagreement will develop an antagonistic
relation based on the mistrust towards one another’s view. These tendencies
will be encoded in an interaction term that for each pair of individuals reflects
the history of their agreement or disagreement at previous times. Past relevant
interactions are only those that lie within the finite range of agent’s memory.
We note that the dynamics of the model we propose is strongly reminiscent
of the dynamics of graded response neural networks [25, 26, 27] which have
been used to describe associative memory. Indeed, the model discussed here
will, under suitable conditions, develop interactions of the Hopfield type [28].
Models of society including Hopfield-like interactions have been already used
in social sciences in a few occasions [16, 17] to study consensus formation and
opinion polarization. In these works Hopfield interactions are introduced and
studied in conjunction with a number of other elements like individual flexibility,
broad-mindedness, and open-mindedness [16] or in more complicated network
structures [17]. Moreover in all these cases the focus of the study was on the
stationary state reached by a society with fixed interpersonal interactions and
how it is approached from a random initial condition. Our contribution will
instead focus on a model society whose internal interactions develop starting
from historical interpersonal relationships. Yet, it will, under suitable condi-
tions, spontaneously turn out to closely resemble a model society exhibiting
Hopfield-like couplings. We will develop a detailed analysis of the way the
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Hopfield-like interactions develop and analyze the resulting collective behaviour
of the system. To this aim we will focus on a society that is constantly under
the influence of new external events and we will pay particular attention to the
reaction of the society to world-wide news, modelled as external fields applied
to it [29, 30]. We will study whether the society does develop self-maintained
collective memories of certain news, and will therefore be irremediably shaped
by them. In literature the concept of collective memory was first introduced
in [31] and only recently scholars have focused on how collective memory is in-
fluenced by media [32, 33]. In our model the possibility for external events to
impress the society will depend on a number of parameters including the extent
of the news influence on single individuals and how frequently they are impact-
ing the society. In particular our model shows that strongly impacting news, or
even just very frequent news, can change the internal structure of the society
in a drastic way and will determine its non linear collective response to future
external influences. The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we will
introduce the model and its main features, before entering into the description
of different scenarios corresponding to different kinds of external information.
The results are presented in Section 3 and organized in the following sections
starting from the simplest scenario to more complicated ones. Given the grow-
ing complexity of the problems studied, not all the cases considered can be fully
solved analytically. For each choice of the external stimuli we first derive all the
analytic predictions we have access to, then we complete the picture by showing
simulation results.
2. The model
The society that we consider is composed of a set of N agents, each poten-
tially connected to all the other agents. With agent i we associate a continuous
preference field ui. Expressed opinions are given by nonlinear functions g(ui)
of the preference field ui of agent i. We will take g(ui) to be of sigmoid form,
implying that expressed opinions remain bounded. We will take the stochastic
dynamics of the system to be of the form:
u˙i = −ui + Ii +
N∑
j 6=i
Jijgj + ηi , (1)
where we use the abbreviation gj = g(uj) and we dropped time dependencies,
which in general pertain to all variables in the equation. Here Jij > 0 repre-
sents a mutually supportive interaction between the individuals i and j while
Jij < 0 indicates an antagonistic interaction between the same agents. The
quantity Ii represents the mass media information as perceived by individuals,
while −ui is a mean reversion term which entails that in absence of external
influences the preference field of each agent will fluctuate around zero. The
last term ηi is a white noise with Gaussian distribution with zero mean and
finite variance 〈ηi(t)ηj(t′)〉 = σ2δijδ(t− t′). The combined effect of individually
3
perceived external sources of information, Ii, and the interaction with others
agents’ expressed opinions, gj , may act to drive the preference field of an agent
away from zero, and thus may favour the development of specific orientations.
The heterogeneous external information Ii is defined as Ii = I0ξi separating
the strength I0 of the signal from the variables ξi encoding the local variability.
Note that such variability might be genuine or arise as a result of individually
variable perception of an underling uniform message (which may be caused by
idiosyncratic interpretations). We simply assume that ξi can only be either +1
or −1.
Finally and most importantly the tendency of each person to agree or disagree
with others is based in our model on the memory of past history of agreement
and disagreement with them. People which have a history of agreement in the
past, will be more likely to agree also in the future, and an analogous result
holds for disagreement. This feature represents the key ingredient of our model.
More specifically we consider the recent history of agreement or disagreement
to have a larger weight than the distant past to take into account how vivid the
experience of past interactions is. We will assume an exponentially weighted
memory and take interactions between agents at time t to be given by
Jij(t) =
J0 · γ
N
∫ t
0
ds gi(s)gj(s)e
−γ(t−s) (2)
for some J0 > 0, assuming for simplicity the time scale τγ = 1/γ of the memory
to be uniform across agents. The normalization factor 1/N is introduced so that
the interaction with other agents is not overwhelmingly dominant, but remains
comparable to the influence of external sources of information in the large N
limit.
In this way we have a society that uses the past history to interpret any in-
stantaneous inputs that it receives. In particular agreement (disagreement) will
be perceived if the value of gi(s)gj(s) will be continuously positive (negative)
on the time scale τγ and will bias agents i and j toward future agreement (dis-
agreement). When the history of past interaction is instead characterized by an
alternation of agreement and disagreement periods the agents will tend to be
neutral with each other, Jij ∼ 0. This memory effect is particularly important
when studying the influence of the external information on the agents’ opin-
ions. Note that the memory that appears in our model, being a memory of past
relations, must not be confused with the memory of past actions or opinions
of single agents that has been more often considered in the literature of social
behaviour [34, 35, 36].
2.1. Agents’ interactions vs Hopfield couplings
The main ingredient of our model is the memory of past interactions, which
is associated with the time scale τγ . The model also contemplates a second
time scale which is the relaxation time of the individual preference ui. The
latter has been set equal to 1, without loss of generality as in general all the
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other parameters and time can be expressed in terms of its unit. A third time
scale ∆0 should be also considered. It is the one associated with the duration
of the exposure of the society to external stimuli. We will typically focus on
the regime τγ ≫ ∆0 ≫ 1 corresponding to a fast adaptation of u to eventual
external stimuli and a slowmemory decay which will be responsible of the storing
of previous opinion configurations in the memory of interpersonal relations.
This process will describe how the whole society can be shaped by its past
by learning from patterns of opinions produced by sustained signals or series
of repeated external stimuli. Among the different scenarios studied, we will
describe the case of the arrival of different external stimuli represented by a
local field changing in time I(t) = I0ξ
µ(t). In this expression p different random
choices of ξµ(t) = (ξ
µ(t)
i ) ∈ {±1}N are considered, one for each integer value in
{1...p} that µ(t) assumes, each of them for a time ∆0. Each of these random
vectors represents the perceived piece of news that influence the society during
the time ∆0 and is later substituted by a different piece of news. Under the
effect of such external influences we expect that the society will likely develop
interactions comparable to the classic Hopfield couplings [28] defined from a
collection of p random patterns ξµ, albeit rescaled by a factor 1/p, so in the
long time limit we expect
Jij ≃ JHij /p =
1
Np
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j . (3)
In fact, if each strong signal clamps the expressed opinions towards the positions
that it suggests (g(t) = ξµ(t)) for a time ∆0 ≪ τγ , and the sequence µ(t) of
the signals’ appearances is repeated many times in τγ , the average over the
past history in Eq.(2) can be approximated by an average over the product of
ξµi and ξ
µ
j as by definition of Hopfield couplings. In section 5 we will discuss
the similarity between the generated interpersonal couplings in our modeled
society and Hopfield couplings in more detail. For the moment it is interesting
to note that, despite the similarity that emerges at first sight, the couplings in
the Hopfield model [28, 25] were taken to be fixed from the start, whereas in
the present case they evolve dynamically under the influence of external signals
and internal dynamics. It is only in the case of the special scenario described
above that we will see the emergence of Hopfield type couplings.
2.2. Numerical details
While a few of the simplest scenarios investigated in the present paper can be
studied analytically, we are in many cases forced to use numerical simulations.
To perform these, we note that the couplings of Eq. (2) satisfy a dynamical
evolution equations:
J˙ij(t) = γ
[
J0
N
gi(t)gj(t)− Jij(t)
]
. (4)
We use Euler integration to integrate Eq. (1) and Eq. (4); we found a step size
dt = 0.1 (with dηi(t) = σ
√
dt) sufficiently small for our purposes. There are
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many parameters involved in the simulations, some are fixed in all the cases,
some vary. The fixed parameters are listed here: we choose N = 100 for the
number of agents and p = 3 for the number of different external signals. Al-
though these numbers are small, they produce results that are representative
of the N → ∞ limit with p ≪ N (as we have checked by using other (p,N)
combinations). Throughout this paper we used a low noise level, σ2 = 0.01,
to ensure that non-trivial collective states can emerge. All simulations start
with random initial conditions ui ∼ N (0, σ2/2) which would be the equilibrium
distribution in a non-interacting system without external signal. The other im-
portant parameters that change from case to case are the time length of each
external signal ∆0, the amplitude I0 of the polarizing signal (apart from a few
exceptions taken to be I0 = 50), the strength of the interactions J0 and the time
scale τγ of the memory of past interactions.
3. Results Overview
Our model is constructed on the simple assumption that the mutual interac-
tions between agents depend on their past history of agreement or disagreement.
Our main result is that this creates a mechanism that allows a society to de-
velop a collective memory of its past experiences. To study this mechanism in
more detail, we analyze different protocols of external influences that first trig-
ger the different individuals’ opinions. The different scenarios presented range
from simple situations to more complex and realistic ones and are listed below
together with a list of the results obtained in each case.
1. The external information I is heterogeneous but constant in time. We are
able to treat the system analytically and predict its long time behaviour.
Already in this simple setting the presence of the signal changes the way
people interact and determines their future behaviour.
2. The signal consists of a sequence of different (random) patterns, repeatedly
presented in a cyclic fashion. In the long run this creates a stable matrix
of interactions between the agents which can be predicted analytically.
By means of this interaction matrix the society develops a memory of the
opinion patterns presented previously and it is found to be able to recall
each of them.
3. A sequence of external stimuli is repeatedly presented in a cyclic fashion
as before. However there are gaps between the presentation of successive
signals where the society is not exposed to an external stimulus and follows
its own internal dynamics. In this scenario a critical ratio of patterns
duration and length of the gaps without pattern presentation must be
exceeded for the system to develop persistent memory of the signal. We
provide an analytic treatment to predict this critical ratio. Interestingly
we also found that in the case of high-impact news that influence the
society very frequently, the presentation time needed for the news to be
memorized by the society is unexpectedly small.
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The study of even more realistic situations such as sequences of external influ-
ences with different impact on the society and random appearance in time will
be considered in a follow up paper.
4. Learning from a persistent external signal
In this section we start illustrating the behaviour of the society described
by our model in a simple setting. Here we study its reaction to an external
information persistent in time and described by a signal Ii = I0ξi where I0 is
its strength and ξi is a random variable taking values in {±1}, which represents
the way in which the agent i perceives it. Note that the uniform perception
Ii = I0 ∀i is a particular case of what discussed here. Our aim is to understand
how the society reacts to this signal and how the memory of the opinions induced
by it develops in this simple case before moving to more complicated settings.
In order to do this, we will study the evolution in time of the agents’ preference
field ui and of interaction couplings Jij between agents. Even in the simple case
of a constant signal, solving the equation for ui is not a trivial task, mainly
because of the dependence of the couplings on the expressed opinions. We
will see that the presence of the signal will induce the agents to change their
opinion, consequently modifying the relationship of agreement and disagreement
between them. As a results of this change, the couplings Jij , which are null
at the beginning of the dynamics, will start to evolve and establish the new
interactions between the agents. This process allows the society to learn the
opinion pattern ξ and to collectively retrieve it in the future.
We can write down a formal solution of Eq. (1) with couplings defined in Eq.
(2):
ui(t) = ui(0)e
−t + J0
∫ t
0
ds [Ui(s) + ηi(s)] e
−(t−s) + I0ξi(1− e−t) , (5)
in which
Ui(s) = γ
∫ s
0
ds′e−γ(s−s
′)gi(s
′)q(s, s′) , (6)
with
q(s, s′) =
1
N
∑
j
gj(s)gj(s
′) . (7)
We note that, by appeal to the law of large numbers, the correlator q(s, s′)
will be non-random in the large N limit. Noting further that, for γ ≪ 1, the
function Ui(s) are very slowly varying funcions of s, we see that:∫ t
0
dsUi(s)e
−(t−s) ≃ Ui(t)
∫ t
0
dse−(t−s) = Ui(t)(1 − e−t) . (8)
To proceed we adopt one further approximation to replace Ui(t) in Eq. (8)
by its noise average (indicated by 〈·〉), which is tantamount to replacing the
gi(s
′) in Eq. (6) by their noise average. While this replacement leads to an
7
underestimation of the noise contribution in the evolution of the ui(t), we found
that the effect remains small in the parameter ranges considered. With this
approximations the solution for ui becomes
ui = ui(0)e
−t + J0〈Ui(t)〉(1 − e−t) +
∫ ∞
0
ηi(τ)e
−τdτ + I0ξi(1− e−t) . (9)
This means that ui will be a Gaussian process with mean
〈ui〉 = ui(0)e−t + J0〈Ui(t)〉(1 − e−t) + I0ξi(1− e−t) , (10)
covariance
C(t, t′) = 〈(ui(t)− 〈ui〉(t))(ui(t′)− 〈ui〉(t′))〉
=
∫ t
0
∫ t′
0
dsds′〈ηi(s)ηi(s′)〉e−(t−s)e−(t′−s′)
=
σ2
2
(
e−|t−t
′| − e−(t+t′)
)
, (11)
and variance
σ2u(t) = C(t, t) =
σ2
2
(1− e−2t) . (12)
We are interested in studying the system in the long time limit t, t′ →∞, where
the ui-process become stationary, with the covariance of the ui only depending
on the time difference τ = |t− t′| = O(1), i.e. C(t, t′) = C(τ), so we will have
lim
t→∞
〈Ui(t)〉 = γ〈gi〉q˜(γ) (13)
where q˜(γ) is the Laplace transform of q(t− s′). The mean of ui, its covariance
and variance will thus become
〈ui〉 = γ〈gi〉q˜(γ)J0 + I0ξi (14)
C(τ) =
σ2
2
e−τ (15)
σ2u = C(0) =
σ2
2
. (16)
Now we realize that 〈ui〉 = ξi〈u〉 and 〈gi〉 = 〈g(〈ui〉+ σuζi)〉ζ = ξi〈g〉, with 〈·〉ζ
being the average taken over ζ ∼ N (0, 1), are a consistent solution of Eq. (14).
This allows us to take out the dependencies on i from the equations.
If we now choose the expressed opinions to be the error functions of the prefer-
ence fields, with gi = erf(ui), we can exploit the properties of the error function
to obtain a self consistency equation for 〈u〉. We will have
〈g〉 = erf
(
〈u〉√
1 + 2σ2u
)
(17)
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and
q(τ) =
〈
erf (〈u〉∞ + σux) erf
(
〈u〉∞ + ρ(τ)σux√
1 + 2(1− ρ2(τ))σ2u
)〉
x
, (18)
where 〈·〉x stands for an average over a Normal random variable x and the
correlation coefficient ρ(τ) is
ρ(τ) =
C(τ)
σ2u
= e−|τ | . (19)
(See [37] for further details on these last passages from a similar computation
in a different context.)
Gathering these results together we obtain a closed system of equations that
describe the preference field of the agents in our society under the effect of a
constant external signal in the stationary regime:
〈u〉 = I0 + J0γerf
(
〈u〉√
1 + 2σ2u
)
q˜(γ) ,
σ2u =
σ2
2
,
q˜(γ) =
∫ ∞
0
dτq(τ)e−γτ ,
q(τ) =
〈
erf (〈u〉+ σux) erf
(
〈u〉+ ρ(τ)σux√
1 + 2(1− ρ2(τ))σ2u
)〉
x
.
In order to understand to what extent the external field has influenced the
society we will focus on the overlap of the asymptotic system state with the
pattern ξ:
m(t) =
1
N
∑
i
ξigi(t) . (20)
This quantity measures whether the expressed opinions in the society are similar
to those induced by the signal ξ, i.e. m ∼ O(1), or not. The overlap is self-
averaging in the N → ∞ limit and its value at late times, t → ∞, is given by
m =
1
N
∑
i
ξi〈gi〉 = 〈g〉 , (21)
which therefore satisfy the following equation
m = erf
(
〈u〉√
1 + 2σ2u
)
= erf
(
I0 + J0γq˜(γ)m√
1 + 2σ2u
)
. (22)
We chose to write the last equation in a self consistent form to show that under
certain conditions we can expect a non zero value of m even when the signal
is finally removed, I0 = 0. Indeed, for sufficiently large values of the product
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J0q˜(γ) in comparison with the noise contribution quantified by σ, the equation
admits a non zero solution. For example, if the society is exposed to a signal
I0 = 1 for long times, given a J0 = 6 and γ = 10
−3 its overlap will be close to 1
and will remain close to 1 when the signal is removed (we will see that in the same
conditions this value will match the results obtained with a simulated dynamics).
In other words the society is potentially able to remember the opinions induced
by the signal even when it is removed, after having been exposed to such signal
for sufficiently long time. To shed more light on this mechanism we now focus
on the evolution of the couplings and the value they reach in the stationary
regime for a society described by a choice of the parameters that admits a non
zero solution to Eq.(22). The upper panel of Fig. 1 shows how couplings evolve
in a numerical simulation starting from a society without interactions between
agents. The continuous curve shows the norm of the Jij matrix defined as
|J | =
√∑
ij
J2ij . (23)
For sufficiently large I0, a simple analytic argument allows us to give an accurate
prediction of this growth. In the presence of a signal Ii = I0ξi, preference fields
rapidly orient towards the signal with large absolute values of ui and gi will
therefore soon be approximately equal to ξi. By using this information we can
integrate Eq. (2) to obtain:
Jij(t) ≈ J0 · γ
N
∫ t
0
ds ξiξje
−γ(t−s) =
J0
N
ξiξj(1− e−γt) , (24)
where the memory time scale appears explicitly. The average absolute value of
this analytic prediction is represented also in units of J0 by the dashed line in
the upper panel of Fig.1 and nicely superimpose with the numerical results. As
the system will quickly approach a stationary state, aligned with the external
signal, interactions further stabilizing that the very same stationary state will
be established after a time set by the memory time scale, chosen to be τγ = 10
in that simulation.
Note that the sign of the predicted couplings is also peculiar. For long times
the Jij approach the Mattis couplings [38]:
lim
t→∞
Jij(t) =
J0
N
ξiξj ≡ JMij (25)
equivalent to the Hopfield couplings in Eq.(3) for p=1. It is well known that
in a system with pairwise interactions given by Mattis couplings (Eq.(25)) with
sufficiently large amplitude, the variables spontaneously align in the directions
defined by ξ. In our modelled society this would correspond to the fact that
the opinion pattern can be spontaneously retrieved because the corresponding
Mattis couplings have been formed as a consequence of the memory of the
sustained past opinion patterns induced by the exposure to the signal Ii = I0ξi.
10
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Figure 1: Simulated dynamics with a persistent external signal. Upper panel: results from
simulations for |J |/J0 are compared with the analytical prediction (Eq. (24)) and are seen to
approach the asymptotic Mattis couplings (Eq. (25)). Lower panel: the overlap Q between
the simulated and the analytical J is compared with the overlap between the simulated J and
the Mattis couplings. In these simulations J0 = 6, I0 = 1 and γ = 0.1.
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To verify that this is the case we define the correlation
Q =
∑
ij JijJ
′
ij√∑
ij J
2
ij
∑
ij J
′2
ij
(26)
that reveals the degree of alignment between two sets of couplings J = (Jij) and
J ′ = (J ′ij), with Q = 1 implying perfect alignment and Q = 0 the absence of
any correlations. In the lower panel of Fig.1 we exhibit the correlation between
couplings observed in a simulation with both the analytic prediction (Eq. (24))
and the asymptotic Mattis couplings (Eq. (25)). It shows that interactions are
very quickly perfectly correlated with both the analytically predicted couplings
and the Mattis couplings, although their norm is initially smaller than |JM | (see
comparison with the absolute value of JM/J0 in the upper panel of Fig.1). In
conclusion, the memory of interpersonal relations developed in response of an
external stimulus ξ produces in the society interactions of increasing strength,
which are very quickly aligned with Mattis couplings corresponding to the ξ
itself.
For large enough strength of the couplings we can expect that the society will
spontaneously polarize along ξ autonomously sustaining its memory even after
the external signal is gone. To give evidence of this interesting phenomenon we
studied different dynamics in which the external signal ξ is switched on at t = 0
and removed at a time tr. We then focus on the asymptotic average overlap for
1. dynamics in which couplings keep evolving after tr (evolving Jij)
2. dynamics in which couplings are fixed to the value they had at tr (frozen
Jij).
The average overlap for both versions of the dynamics has been calculated as
the average of the simulated overlap at stationarity over the last 1000 units of
time and plotted in Fig. 2 as a function of tr.
The dynamics with frozen Jij shows at which tr the couplings have grown large
enough for a spontaneous m to arise. We note here that this overlap m corre-
sponds to the solution of the self-consistent Eq. (22) derived for the stationary
solution once the amplitude of the asymptotic couplings J0q˜(γ) is replaced by
the amplitude of the frozen couplings |J(tr)| (also reported in Fig. 2) and
I0 = 0. According to this equation the critical value of the strength of Mattis
type couplings needed for the model to exhibit spontaneous order with m > 0 is
|Jc| = 0.148J0 and it corresponds to the |J | = (0.148± 0.003)J0 reached at the
minimum tr where m > 0 in simulations with frozen Jij . We will come back to
this minimum time tr in a different context in Section 6.
Interestingly the dynamics with evolving Jij is instead characterized by an
asymptotic spontaneous overlap arising in a discontinuous way even before that
minimum tr. Indeed, at variance with the frozen case, the evolving couplings
will continue to grow after tr even in absence of the external signal as a re-
sult of the interactions embedded in the system. If this residual reinforcement
of the couplings is large enough a positive feedback loop will occur between
the evolving couplings and the degree of order supported by the interactions
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Figure 2: Simulated dynamics with a persistent external signal. The figure shows the value
of m at stationarity as a function of the time tr at which the signal is removed, for two kind
of dynamics: 1) dynamics with evolving couplings after tr 2) dynamics with frozen couplings
after tr . The dashed line represents the amplitude of couplings norm |J(tr)| at tr . The
parameters used are the same as Fig. 1.
currently established in the society. The degree of order will be strengthened
by strong interactions, which will in turn grow further due to a higher degree
of persistence of the expressed opinion pattern. As soon as this self-sustained
mechanism takes place it leads to a strongly polarized society represented by
the large value of m in Fig. 2.
In the following sections we will study more complicated cases in which the
external signal is composed of a sequence of different stimuli both with and
without interposed periods of complete absence of stimuli. The understanding
of the system’s reaction to a single external stimulus gained in the present sec-
tion as well as the quantities introduced here will be used in the next sections
to understand if and how the society is able to learn and subsequently retrieve
the different opinion patterns to which it has been exposed in the past.
5. Periodic external signal
As a second step in the exploration of our society’s behaviour we will change
the external information structure, passing from a constant signal I0ξ to a signal
that changes in time. The aim is mimicking a sequence of different news or
events, labeled by the index µ ∈ {1, . . . , p}, to which the society is exposed and
reacts. As before, the variables ξµ represent the way in which the population
reacts to a single piece of information, and are modelled as random variables
with entries ξµi ∈ {±1}. The different contributions Iµ = I0ξµ will appear in an
ordered sequence, each switched on for a time span ∆0 before being substituted
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by the following piece of news in the sequence. This process is repeated in a
cyclic fashion. The resulting expression of the signal is thus
Ii(t) = I0ξ
µ(t)
i , (27)
with
µ(t) = 1 +
⌊
t
∆0
⌋
mod p , (28)
where ⌊·⌋ is the notation for the integer part. This series of repetitive signals
represents a simple but effective way to model series of events that are repeatedly
appearing in television or newspapers.
As introduced in section 2.1, we expect that in the long run the exposure of the
society to a sequence of signals defined in Eq. (27) and (28) will result in the
development of couplings that are similar to the Hopfield couplings (Eq. (3)).
Indeed as before, given a signal with large amplitude I0, we can assume that the
opinions gi become rapidly equal to the opinion pattern proposed every time
we have a signal spike, so we have that g(t) = ξµ(t). For this assumption to
provide an accurate approximation of the full dynamics, we also assume that
∆0 ≫ 1 allowing us indeed to neglect transient behaviour after the switches of
the external signal. Using this approximation we can calculate (see Appendix
A for details) the couplings Jij developed in the society at times t, which are
multiples of the presentation time p∆0:
Jij =
J0
N
(eγ∆0 − 1) (e
−γt − 1)
(1− eγ∆0p)
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
(µ−1)∆0γ (29)
In the long time limit t→∞ (thus Np →∞) this tends to
lim
Np→∞
Jij(t = Np∆0p) = Jij,∞(p) =
J0
N
(eγ∆0 − 1)
(eγ∆0p − 1)
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
(µ−1)∆0γ . (30)
Eq. (30) shows explicitly that the learning protocol allows the couplings to
approach in the long run a weighted version of the Hopfield couplings where each
pattern’s weight is a function of its presentation order (µ). This means that we
expect an uneven storing of the patterns: the pattern last seen is remembered
best, while the memory of the previous ones decays exponentially on a time
scale τγ , in a similar way as in some generalized Hopfield models of forgetful
memories [39, 40, 41]. Finally expanding equation (30) for small γ∆0 (many
repetitions of news presented within a memory time) we obtain
Jij,∞ =
J0
pN
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j +
J0
pN
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j (µ− 1)∆0γ + o((∆0γ)2) . (31)
Note that the first term is proportional to the Hopfield couplings (see Eq. (3)),
which can be thus thought as a zeroth order approximation to our couplings.
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Similarly to what happens in Hopfield Neural Networks, our society will be able
in the long run to store and easily retrieve the opinion patterns ξµ. The level of
retrieval of the society for each of the patterns µ can be evaluated using a set
of overlaps mµ:
mµ(t) =
1
N
∑
i
ξµi gi(t) . (32)
These overlaps will tell us if the system is aligned with one of the opinion
configurations previously presented (mµ = O(1)) or not (mµ = O(1/
√
N)). The
value of mµ in the long time limit can be obtained assuming the Gaussianity of
ui (as done in the scenario of the previous section) and evaluating the average
ui in the following way: we use the couplings evaluated in Eq. (30) to evaluate
the long term limit of Eq. (1). In the absence of a signal (Ii = 0 ∀i) we thus
obtain ui ∼ N (〈ui〉, σ2u), with
〈ui〉 =
∑
j
Ji,j,∞〈gj〉 (33)
σ2u = σ
2/2 , (34)
and
〈gi〉 = erf
(
〈ui〉√
1 + 2σ2u
)
= erf
(
(eγ∆0 − 1)
(eγ∆0p − 1)
J0
∑p
µ=1 ξ
µ
i m
µe(µ−1)∆0γ√
1 + σ2
)
. (35)
If different patterns have negligible mutual overlaps, such as for uncorrelated
patterns with 1N
∑
i ξ
µ
i ξ
ν
i ∼ 1√N for µ 6= ν, the equation above can have a non
trivial solution for which the society aligns with exactly one of the patterns, ν.
In this case m ≃ {0, ..0,mν, 0..., 0} and
mν ≃ erf
(
mνJ0
(eγ∆0 − 1)
(eγ∆0p − 1)
e(ν−1)∆0γ√
1 + σ2
)
. (36)
Note that under certain conditions the solution of Eq. (36) is non trivial and
will be larger for more recently presented patterns and smaller for older ones,
meaning that, if remembered at all, recent pieces of news will be better recalled
by the society.
As a confirmation of this behaviour we simulated the dynamics of our society
until a time tr at which we froze the couplings. To check whether the society
has developed a memory of the p external signals to which it has been exposed,
after tr we apply each signal contribution again for a short time after which we
remove it to observe the response of the society in terms of the overlaps mµ in
absence of it. As shown in Fig. 3, the society quickly reacts to each of the spikes
after tr = 6090 as the corresponding m
µ (highlighted in Fig. 3 with different
colours for different signal patterns) jumps to 1 during the spike and relaxes
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Figure 3: Simulated dynamics with periodic external signal. Upper panel: Early dynamics
of the society. The overlaps with different patterns are represented by different colours and
quickly reach mµ ≃ 1 when their corresponding signal contribution ξµ is on. Lower panel:
after presenting many times the patterns in a cyclic fashion, we freeze the couplings at time
tr = 6090 and we presented each of the patterns for a time very short compared to ∆0, after
which the signal is removed. The analytic predictions of the overlaps in absence of signal are
compared with the simulations. In this simulation we set I0 = 50, J0 = 6, γ = 10−3 and
∆0 = 70.
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∆0 = 70 I0 = 1 I0 = 5 I0 = 50 Analytical
m1 0.72 ± 4 ·10−2 0.966 ± 9 · 10−3 0.97 ± 1·10−2 0.9905
m2 0.74 ± 4 ·10−2 0.9894 ± 4·10−4 0.9887 ± 6 · 10−4 0.9948
m3 0.75 ± 4 ·10−2 0.9943 ± 3·10−4 0.9947 ± 2·10−4 0.9973
Table 1: The table shows the values of mµ obtained averaging mµ over 100 simulations with
fixed ∆0 for different values of I0, against their analytical predictions. The control parameter
of the simulations are J0 = 6 and γ = 10−3.
to a non trivial value in absence of external signal. It remains stationary until
the subsequent spike of a different pattern is applied. The expected stationary
non trivial overlap mµ obtained from Eq. (36) matches quite well with the
simulation results. To further confirm our findings we defined the quantities mµ
as the average of mµ over 100 simulations and we compared them for different
strength I0 of the signal applied during the dynamics, with their analytical
predictions in Table 1. In this case to obtain mµ in each simulation we froze the
couplings at tr and we averaged the values ofm
µ on the last 2000 steps after the
corresponding subsequent signal spike. We note that predictions always slightly
overestimate the simulation results. The two main reasons for this discrepancy
are that in Eq. (9) we neglected the contributions of the fluctuations of gi(t) and
that the transients of the ui dynamics after every change of external signal were
neglected in the analytical evaluation of the couplings. Moreover the theory
works better for higher I0 as the assumption we made that the opinions align
immediately to the signal becomes more accurate for large signals. Finally we
can observe that predictions get worse for earlier external signals. Indeed they
are associated with smaller effective couplings in Eq. (1) and consequently
overlap solutions more susceptible to the neglected fluctuations.
The possibility to store and retrieve all the presented external signals as shown
in Fig. 3 is expected, given the similarity between the spontaneously formed
interaction couplings and classical Hopfield couplings (see Eq. (3)). For the
simulation reported in Fig. 3 we indeed find that interactions very soon align
almost perfectly with corresponding Hopfield couplings as shown in the upper
panel of Fig. 4. The figure also shows that analytic predictions of J from Eq.
(29) are very accurate as the corresponding Q ≃ 1 at all times for J analytical.
As discussed in the previous section, the possibility for the society to retrieve
the pattern induced by an external signal requires sufficiently large couplings
to allow a non-zero solution of Eq. (36). In the bottom panel of Fig. 4 we
compare the norm of J (defined in Eq. (23)) obtained with simulations to its
analytical prediction and the norm of the Hopfield couplings over p JH/p. The
evolution of the analytical curve predicts closely the evolution of the simulated
|J |/J0 while |JH |/p overestimates the true value of |J | at the beginning of the
dynamics. However at tr = 6090 the value of the simulated |J | has reached a
stationary value very close to |JH |/p. The society has been irremediably shaped
by the opinion patterns ξµ.
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Figure 4: Simulations with periodic external signal. The upper panel shows the evolution
of the correlation Q between the simulated and the analytical J and between the simulated
J and the Hopfield couplings JH/p. The lower panel shows the evolution of |J | against its
estimated analytical evolution and the norm of the Hopfield couplings over p |JH |/p in units
of J0. The control parameters are the same as figure 3.
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6. Intermittent external signal
In this section we study a still stylized but slightly more complicated sce-
nario. We analyse the response of the society to intermittent external informa-
tion. We keep the cyclic presentation mode described in the previous section.
However, the different opinion patterns are no longer influencing the society for
the entire presentation period ∆0, but only for a fraction θ∆0 of each period,
with θ < 1. The signal is absent for the remainder ∆1 = (1 − θ)∆0 of the
presentation period:
Ii(t) =
{
I0ξ
µ(t)
i n∆0 < t ≤ n∆0 + θ∆0
0 otherwise
(37)
with n ∈ N and
µ(t) = 1 +
⌊
t
∆0
⌋
mod p . (38)
In this way we represent a society hit by a periodic sequence of different strong
stimuli, such as repetitive political propaganda or a series of shocking events (e.g.
terrorist attacks) alternated with periods of absence of external information.
Questions that arise in such a scenario are: Will the society be shaped by these
shocks? What is the smallest fraction θ of the time for which the system is
exposed to external stimuli that still allows the society to spontaneously retain
the information presented?
To evaluate the couplings in this case, we assume that during the time θ∆0 in
which the signal I0ξ
µ is on, the preference fields immediately align and g = ξµ,
which requires the signal strength I0 to be sufficiently large. As long as the
society remains unable to retain the presented patterns, we find that, as soon as
the signal is removed, the preference fields very quickly decay to 0 and remain
small during the time ∆1 in which the signal is off. Once the society has
been exposed to sufficiently many presentation cycles, couplings of sufficient
strength may have developed allowing the society to retain information about
the latest pattern presented, even when the signal is removed. When evaluating
the couplings for this situation, we assume for simplicity that the system remains
nearly fully aligned with the previously presented pattern, g ≃ ξµ, even after the
the signal is turned off. Figure 5 shows a simulation exhibiting a transition from
an early time regime, where information is not retained after signal removal, to
a late time regime, where the system remains aligned with a signal even at times
where the signal is switched off. In Fig. 6, we present a zoom into both the
early time and the late time regimes. Shaded rectangles in the figure represent
the intervals θ∆0 in which an external signal is present. At early time when the
signal is switched off, the opinions take some time to disalign to it. This extra
time, that we will indicate as θ′∆0, is not easy to calculate, however we can give
a rough estimation of it assuming that the preference field ui(t) freely decays
to zero when the signal is removed (see Appendix B). We define the time t∗,
in multiples of p∆0, as the time of the last cycle of external stimuli that is still
insufficient to create couplings of a strength needed for the society to retain
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Figure 5: Simulated dynamics with intermittent signal. Three patterns are presented in
a cyclic fashion. Each pattern presentation for a time θ∆0 = 70 is followed by a period
∆1 = 30 during which there is no external signal. Each time a pattern is presented the
corresponding overlap mµ very quickly approaches 1, and it decays to smaller values when the
signal is removed. At early times, couplings are still too small to retain previously presented
information and overlaps decay to small O(1/√N) values when external signals are removed.
However, after a time t∗ ≃ 600 the couplings are able to sustain the opinion patterns even
when the signal is removed. In this simulations I0 = 5, J0 = 6 and γ = 10−3
Figure 6: The figures represent a zoom into the early time regime (left panel), and into the
late time regime (right panel) of Fig. 5. The coloured rectangles represent the time periods in
which a signal is switched on. After the signal removal at early times the value of mµ drops
to significantly lower values, whereas it remains much close to mµ = 1 at late times.
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the previously presented information. Using the signal structure defined in Eq.
(37), we can derive an expression for the couplings for t < t∗ and for t > t∗
under the simplifying assumptions made above (details of the calculations in
Appendix C):
Jij(t < t
∗) =
J0
N
(eγ∆0(θ+θ
′) − 1)e−γt (1− e
γt)
(1 − eγ∆0p)
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
∆0γ(µ−1) (39)
Jij(t > t
∗) =
J0
N
e−γt
(
(eγ∆0(θ+θ
′) − eγ∆0) (1− e
γt∗)
(1− eγ∆0p)
+ (eγ∆0 − 1) (1 − e
γt)
(1− eγ∆0p)
) p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
(µ−1)∆0γ
(40)
The couplings in Eq.s (39) and (40) are for simplicity evaluated only for integer
multiples of ∆0. As shown in Fig. 7, the couplings thus predicted compare
remarkably well with those evaluated in a numerical simulation of the dynamics
as presented in Fig. 6. However, given the approximations used in the estima-
tion of θ′ we cannot expect to have a perfect agreement between the analytical
prediction and the simulations (the limitations of our approach are discussed in
Appendix D). In Fig. 7, the choice of parameters is such that the interactions
rapidly align with the Hopfield couplings, and their norm grows along the dy-
namics eventually granting retrieval of the signal patterns after a finite time t∗.
To determine t∗, we use these equations to obtain an expression for the cou-
plings J at time t∗+(θ+ θ′)∆0 (see Appendix C for details of the calculation)
and use these in the self-consistency equation for m1 (also derived in the same
appendix)
m1 = erf
(
m1
J0(1− e−γ∆0(θ+θ′))√
(1 + σ2)
(1− e−γ(t∗+∆0p))
(1− e−γ∆0p)
)
. (41)
The value of t∗ is then obtained by requiring that Eq. (41) has a non trivial
solution, which gives
t∗ = −∆0p
[
1 +
1
γ∆0p
log
(
1−
√
(1 + σ2)
J0(1− e−γ∆0(θ+θ′))
√
pi
2
(1− e−γ∆0p)
)]
. (42)
Note that t∗ increases with decreasing θ, and it will eventually diverge (and a
finite t∗ will cease to exist) as θ is decreased below θmin
θmin = −
1
γ∆0
log
(
1−
√
pi(1 + σ2)
2J0
(1 − e−γ∆0p)
)
− θ′ (43)
= − 1
γ∆0
log
(
1−
√
pi(1 + σ2)
2J0
(1 − e−γ∆0p)
)
− 1
∆0
log
(
I0(1− e−∆0θ)
0.74
)
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Figure 7: The upper panel shows the evolution in time of the correlation Q between the
simulated J , its analytical prediction and the Hopfield couplings over p, JH/p. The lower
panel compares the norm of J/J0 from simulations to its analytical prediction and to the
norm of JH/p. The control parameters are the same as Fig. 5.
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for which the argument of the logarithm in Eq. (42) vanishes and where θ′
is evaluated in Appendix B. The solution of this equation can be found nu-
merically and the resulting behaviour in function of 1/∆0 is shown in Fig. 8.
The condition θ > θmin thus guarantees the existence of a finite time t
∗ at
which persistent memory starts to form, and at least one of the patterns stored
can be recovered1. The existence of a minimum value of θ required for the
society to be able to spontaneously retrieve the information contained in the
signals presented earlier is of immediate practical relevance. For advertisement
campaigns, for instance, it defines the minimum fraction of time needed for a
repeatedly presented signal to permanently impress the audience as a collective
body. In the domain of news, it would, for instance allow to assess, whether or
not repeated news items might leave a subtle persistent trace in the society and
produce collective responses otherwise unpredictable.
To verify our predictions of θmin we simulated dynamics with external signal
of different amplitude I0 until stationary interaction couplings are reached. We
then froze the couplings and counted how many times the society recovers at
least one of the patterns2 after a signal spike. Recovery is reached when the
corresponding overlap in absence of external signal satisfies the threshold con-
dition mµ > 0.4. Such recovery threshold has been chosen significantly higher
than the overlap (∼ 1/√N = 0.1) expected if the system state is uncorrelated
with the pattern, but not too high in order not to exclude recovery with a low
O(1) overlap given the system parameters. We finally estimate θmin from sim-
ulations as the smallest θ for which at least half of 50 trial runs of the dynamics
show such retrieval behaviour. In Fig. 8 we plot θmin for different values of I0
as a function of the inverse total presentation time 1/∆0 alongside the analytic
prediction θmin obtained above.
As clearly visible in the figure, for large ∆0 the analytic curve gives a good
prediction of the simulation results for all the signal strengths, confirming that
there is not significant dependence on I0 in this regime. It is interesting to no-
tice that in this regime the value of (θmin+ θ
′)∆0 corresponds to the minimum
time needed by the society to embed a single pattern presented with a persistent
signal (the minimum tr mentioned in section 5):
θmin + θ
′ ≃ − 1
γ∆0
log
(
1−
√
pi(1 + σ2)
2J0
)
(44)
assuming J0 >
√
pi(1 + σ2)/2. This means that at the beginning of the dynam-
ics the society is able to maintain its orientation towards the very first pattern
seen, that will be the one most easily remembered.
Interestingly at small ∆0 a much stronger dependence on I0 develops. The
analytical curves qualitatively capture the trend of the numerical ones but over-
1For θ > θmin at least one pattern will be recovered, but this does not guarantee that the
first pattern of the cyclically repeated sequence is among those recovered.
2This includes also mixture states with m = (m1, m2,m3), where m1 6= 0, m2 6= 0 and
m3 6= 0, which are also encountered in some instances.
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Figure 8: Simulated relation between the minimum θ necessary for the recovery of at least
one pattern and the inverse of the time ∆0 compared with their analytical estimation for
γ = 10−3 and different signal strengths.
estimate their true value. This discrepancy can be related to the approximations
used in the estimate of θ′. When solving the dynamics in the fraction of time
θ′∆0 we neglect the interactions between agents. In doing this we underestimate
the partial memory that has started to form in the society, and consequently
overestimate the θmin needed for recovery.
Lastly but very importantly we note that both numerical results and analytic
estimations show a decrease in θmin at small ∆0 which is more pronounced
when I0 is larger. This phenomenon is a direct consequence of the fact that
θ′ increases with I0, therefore for larger I0 the term ∆0θ′ allows recovery with
smaller θmin. In applications the fact that θmin reaches very small values for
small ∆0 and large I0 would suggest to invest in short but frequent and high-
impact advertisements. Similarly we can conclude that shocking events such
as terror attacks, if repeated on short periods, might leave deep traces in the
society despite being very localised in time.
7. Conclusions
News of disruptive events in history such as terror attacks often appear to
change the behaviour of a society and will influence how people will react to
news of future events of a similar kind. In this work we introduce a simple model
of opinion dynamics which includes otherwise well-studied phenomena such as
homophily [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] (the tendency of people to interact more often
with others who share similar opinions) and xenophobia [16, 17, 23, 24] (the
tendency to adopt opinions different different from those of people with whom
there has been disagreement in the past). The model includes dynamically
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evolving couplings, which effectively record an exponentially weighted history
of co-expressed opinions between any pair of agents in the system. We show
how this mechanism allows a society do develop a collective memory of external
information it had previously been exposed to, allowing it to spontaneously
retrieve such information in the future when briefly triggered by exposure to
that information.
We study the emergence of this type of collective memory both analytically and
by way of simulations for three stylized scenarios representing different histories
of exposure to external information: (i) information consisting of a persistent
signal, (ii) information consisting of repeated presentations of a set of different
signal patterns, and (iii) information consisting of repeated presentations of a
set of different signal patterns separated by periods of absence of any signal. In
the first scenario, the external information does not change in time; the society
aligns to the signal and — after a sufficiently long time of exposure to the signal
— will remember it in the future even when the signal is removed. In the second
scenario, the society is exposed to a series of signals, corresponding to different
news. If these news are repeated for a sufficient number of times, the society is
able to remember all of them, and recall them in the future when triggered by a
brief spike of the same information. This can be true also in the third scenario,
in which the different news are are interspersed with phases of absence of any
signal. The determining factor here is the relative length of the periods of signal
presentation and signal removal. We were able to compute the critical minimal
ratio of presentation time and signal removal time that allows the society to
develop a persistent memory of the sequence of news and thereby to remain
aligned to external information even when the signal is removed. Moreover we
demonstrated that even very short signals, if sufficiently strong and repeated
sufficiently often, can guarantee the spontaneous retrieval of their information.
In the three scenarios analysed, polarizing signals presented to the society were
able to deeply change the collective behaviour of the society described by our
model, in the sense that persistent memory of past events emerged which causes
it to react differently in the future. The condition for this to occur is always
that the bare coupling constant J0 in the model is sufficiently large compared
to the noise level of the dynamics. Thus our model is able to capture, how the
collective behaviour of a society can be strongly influenced by its past events.
A follow up work will concern the study of the model under more realistic
assumptions about signal structures, including presentation of news items in
random order and presentation of news with different signal intensities. An
interesting further generalization that could be considered to make the model
more realistic is to define interactions depending on multidimensional (rather
than binary scalar) opinions so as to represent the effect that individuals interact
in ways which depend on judgments about a collection of topics. In this setting
the evolving interactions based on past interpersonal agreement or disagreement
on the entire set of topics would correlate the agents’ response to the different
topic in a non trivial way.
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Appendix A. Analytical prediction of Jij for a repetitive signal
We want to give an analytical estimation of Jij for a signal defined in Eqs.
(27) and (28). For simplicity, we will evaluate the couplings only at the end of
each pattern presentation period (i.e., for times t which are integer multiples
of ∆0). We thus define Jij(ν, t) as the coupling at time t = Npp∆0 + ν∆0, in
which Np is the number of complete cycles of p patterns and ν < p the number
of additional patterns seen in the final (possibly incomplete) cycle presented up
to time t. If we assume that as soon as the signal is switched on, the expressed
opinions g will for each µ presented align with the pattern ξµ, then Jij(ν, t) will
take the form
Jij(ν, t) =
J0
N
γ
∫ t
0
dse−γ(t−s)gi(s)gj(s)
=
J0
N
γ
[(
ξ1i ξ
1
j
∫ ∆0
0
dse−γ(t−s) + ...
+ξpi ξ
p
j
∫ p∆0
(p−1)∆0
dse−γ(t−s)
)
+
(
ξ1i ξ
1
j
∫ (p+1)∆0
p∆0
dse−γ(t−s) + ...
+ ξpi ξ
p
j
∫ 2p∆0
(2p−1)∆0
dse−γ(t−s)
)
+ ...
+
(
ξ1i ξ
1
j
∫ (Npp+1)∆0
Npp∆0
dse−γ(t−s) + ...
+ ξνi ξ
ν
j
∫ t=(Npp+ν)∆0
(Npp+ν−1)∆0
dse−γ(t−s)
)]
. (A.1)
Using ∫ a+∆0
a
eγsds =
∫ ∆0
0
eγx+γadx =
(eγ∆0 − 1)eγa
γ
, (A.2)
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we obtain
Jij =
J0
N
e−γt(eγ∆0 − 1)
[(
ξ1i ξ
1
j + ...+ ξ
p
i ξ
p
j e
γ(p−1)∆0
)
+
(
ξ1i ξ
1
j e
γp∆0 + ...+ ξpi ξ
p
j e
γ(2p−1)∆0
)
+ ...
+
(
ξ1i ξ
1
j e
γNpp∆0 + ...+ ξνi ξ
ν
j e
γ(Npp+ν−1)∆0
)]
. (A.3)
Now we can group the terms and using t = Npp∆0 + ν∆0 we have
Jij(ν, t) =
J0
N
(eγ∆0 − 1)

e−γt p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
(µ−1)∆0γ
(t−ν∆0)/(p∆0)−1∑
k=0
eγ∆0pk
+
ν∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
−(ν−µ+1)∆0γ
)
=
J0
N
(eγ∆0 − 1)
(
(e−γt − e−γν∆0))
(1− eγ∆0p)
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
(µ−1)∆0γ
+
ν∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
−(ν−µ+1)∆0γ
)
. (A.4)
Appendix B. θ′ estimation for intermittent signal
We would like to have an estimate of the the time needed by the expressed
opinions to disalign with the signal when this is removed. Given that we are
not able to evaluate the integral in Eq. (2) during the decaying transient of
gi(t), we can estimate it considering |gi(s)gj(s)| = 1 for a time (θ+ θ′)∆0 and 0
for the remaining time ∆0(1 − θ − θ′). The time θ′∆0 can be estimated as the
time in which |gi(s)gj(s)| falls to half of its value at the removal of the signal
(that is approximately 1). In this way the overestimation implied by assuming
|gi(s)gj(s)| = 1 for s ≤ θ′∆0 is compensated by the underestimation made by
assuming |gi(s)gj(s)| = 0 at subsequent times. We can give a rough estimate
of gi during the decay assuming that the signal is switched on at time 0 and as
soon as it is removed the preference fields follow:
u(t) = 〈u(∆0θ)〉e−t . (B.1)
where we recall that u = ξiui and ui(θ∆0) is the solution of Eq. (1) just before
the signal is removed. Here we also assume that the interactions between the
agents and the noise are neglected, such that the preference field freely decay
to 0. Using this, we can calculate the time t = θ′∆0 for which |gi(t)gj(t)| = 0.5
that is:
θ′ ≃ 1
∆0
log(〈u(∆0θ)〉/0.74) . (B.2)
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In order to find ui(θ∆0) we use Eq. (9) and we assume that the opinions are 0
before the signal is presented and they align to it as soon as it is switched on
with gi ∼ ξµi . As a consequence in Eq. (9) we will have ui(0) = 0 and
〈Ui(∆0θ)〉 = γ
N
∫ ∆0θ
0
ds e−γ(∆0θ−s)gi(s)
∑
j
gj(s)gj(∆0θ)
= ξ1im(t)(1 − e−γ∆0θ) , (B.3)
which in the limit ∆0 ≪ τγ which we consider in this paper gives:
|〈Ui(∆0θ)〉| = |m(t)γ∆0θ| ≪ 1 (B.4)
and so it is negligible respect to the other terms in the equation. The final
estimation of 〈u(∆0θ)〉 will thus be:
〈u(∆0θ)〉 = I0(1− e−∆0θ) , (B.5)
that inserted in Eq. (B.2) gives:
θ′ =
1
∆0
log
(
I0(1 − e−∆0θ)
0.74
)
. (B.6)
We want also to remark that neglecting the terms in Eq. (B.4) from the calcu-
lations does not influence significantly the final result. In fact if we substitute
m ≃ 1 in Eq. (B.4) and we use this to estimate θ′ the results that we obtain
once the other parameters inserted the results do not differ substantially when
compared to those obtained by neglecting this subdominant contribution.
Appendix C. Jij for intermittent signal
Given a signal of the form in Eq. (37) and (38) we want to calculate the
couplings Jij in our model. In order to do this we will assume that at the
beginning of the dynamics, as soon as soon as each signal contribution µ is
switched on, the preference field aligns to it with gi = ξ
µ
i . The opinions will
remain aligned to the signal for a time ∆0(θ + θ
′) where θ∆0 is the time the
signal is actually on and θ′∆0 is the additional time the opinions remain aligned
to the signal during the decay of the preference field gi.
Let us define t = Np∆0p, with Np as the total number of complete cycles
of p pattern presentations seen at time t. Following the same reasoning of
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Appendix A we will calculate J at time t as:
Jij = J0
γ
N
∫ t
0
e−γ(t−s)gi(s)gj(s)
= J0
γ
N
(
ξ1i ξ
1
j
∫ ∆0(θ+θ′)
0
e−γ(t−s)ds+ ...
+ ξpi ξ
p
j
∫ ∆0(p−1+θ+θ′)
∆0(p−1)
e−γ(t−s)ds
)
+ ...
+
(
ξ1i ξ
1
j
∫ ∆0((Np−1)p+θ+θ′)
(Np−1)p∆0
e−γ(t−s)ds+ ...
+ξpi ξ
p
j
∫ ∆0(Np(p−1)+θ+θ′)
∆0Np(p−1)
e−γ(t−s)ds
)
(C.1)
Now using ∫ a+∆0(θ+θ′)
a
eγsds =
(
eγ∆0(θ+θ
′) − 1
) eγa
γ
, (C.2)
we get
Jij =
J0
N
(
eγ∆0(θ+θ
′) − 1
)
e−γt
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
∆0γ(µ−1)
Np−1∑
k=0
e∆0γpk
(C.3)
and finally exploiting
Np−1∑
k=0
e∆0γpk =
(1− eγ∆0pNp)
(1− eγ∆0p) =
(1− eγt)
(1− eγ∆0p) (C.4)
we obtain
Jij =
J0
N
(eγ∆0(θ+θ
′) − 1) (e
−γt − 1)
(1− eγ∆0p)
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
∆0γ(µ−1) . (C.5)
If the amplitude J0 of the couplings is too small for the given noise level of
the dynamics, the society may never be able to retrieve any of the information
it was previously exposed to, in which case the above expression holds for all t.
Otherwise, if J0 is large enough, for some θ the society is able to retrieve the
pattern 1 at time t = t∗ +∆0(θ + θ′) after its presentation, with t∗ = N∗p∆0p.
For this to happen we thus need a non-trivial solution of:
m1 = erf
(
m1
J0(1− e−γ∆0(θ+θ′))√
(1 + σ2)
(e−γ(t
∗+∆0p) − 1)
(e−γ∆0p − 1)
)
, (C.6)
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obtained using J at t = t∗ + (θ + θ′)∆0:
Jij =
J0
N
(1− e−γ∆0(θ+θ′))
[
(e−γt
∗ − 1)
(1− eγ∆0p)
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
∆0γ(µ−1) +
+ξ1i ξ
1
j
]
. (C.7)
We thus need
J0(1 − e−γ∆0(θ+θ′))√
(1 + σ2)
(1 − e−γ(t∗+∆0p))
(1− e−γ∆0p)
2√
pi
≥ 1 (C.8)
which is possible after a time
t∗ = −∆0p
[
1 +
1
γ∆0p
log
(
1−
√
(1 + σ2)
J0(1− e−γ∆0(θ+θ′))
√
pi
2
(1− e−γ∆0p)
)]
.
(C.9)
In order for this time to be finite θ should be larger than a certain threshold
that is calculated in the main text. For time larger than t∗ we thus have that
the opinions remain aligned with the signal even when this is removed, so the
couplings J can be calculated considering gi = ξ
µ
i for the whole time interval
∆0. This means that to calculate J at a time t = Np∆0p > t
∗ we need to add
terms to the sum of integrals in Eq. (C.1), which are integrals of the kind of
Eq. (C.2) albeit with the upper limit replaced by a + ∆0. This results in the
following couplings:
Jij =
J0
N
e−γt

(eγ∆0(θ+θ′) − 1) p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
(µ−1)∆0γ
N∗
p
−1∑
k=0
eγ∆0pk
+ (eγ∆0 − 1)
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
(µ−1)∆0γ
Np−1∑
k=N∗
p
eγ∆0pk

 (C.10)
=
J0
N
e−γt
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j e
(µ−1)∆0γ
[
(eγ∆0(θ+θ
′) − 1)(1− e
γ∆0pN
∗
p )
(1− eγ∆0p)
+ (eγ∆0 − 1)(e
γ∆0pN
∗
p − eγ∆0pNp)
(1− eγ∆0p)
]
(C.11)
For simplicity in this appendix we calculated Jij only for discrete times multiple
of p∆0. However we can remark that it is possible to calculate them for any
time, following the same reasoning used here.
Appendix D. The role of signal strength for intermittent signals
The analytically predicted couplings J do not always give the true norm |J |
of the couplings in our model, given that the approximations made in the cal-
culations are of limited validity. In Fig. D.9 we exhibit the dynamical evolution
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Figure D.9: Intermittent signal dynamics. The figure shows an example of the evolution of
|J |/J0 in time for J analytical and from simulations and different signal strengths given three
fixed patterns. The control parameters are γ = 10−3, J0 = 6,∆0 = 50 and ∆1 = 37.5.
of |J |/J0 for intermittent signals for a variety of signal strengths and observe
that while the analytic theory does predict the true evolution reasonably well
for small values I0 of the signal strength, the analytical prediction fails qualita-
tively for very large values of I0. The different curves in the figure correspond
to dynamics with parameters other than the signal strength I0 identical for all
curves. The analytical prediction appears to work better for simulations with
smaller I0. This is due to approximations used in the estimation of the time
θ′∆0 needed by the preference fields to decay to 0 when the signal is removed
after a pattern presentation. Our estimation does in fact neglect the effect of
the couplings during the decay. For I0 = 1 the time θ
′∆0 is not large enough to
allow the couplings to grow much and neglecting their contribution in our cal-
culation does not effect significantly the prediction of |J |. For I0 = 50, the time
∆0θ
′ is large enough to allow the coupling to grow to sufficiently large values to
permit eventual spontaneous recall, so neglecting them results in a substantial
error in the prediction of |J |. In fact, in the case of I0 = 50, after a time t∗
(approximately equal to the time of the steep increase of |J |/J0 in the figure)
the couplings have become sufficiently strong to sustain the opinion patterns
when the signal is removed, kickstarting the positive feedback-loop which even-
tually results in the society being capable of nearly perfect spontaneous pattern
retrieval — a behaviour very different from the one predicted analytically for
the given parameters (for which a finite t∗ does not exist).
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